"Associate professor of finance and director of the Personal Financial Planning Program, Gordon Ford College of Business, Western Kentucky University; and principal, Scholar Financial, LLC, a fee-only registered investment adviser. …
"My testimony will not represent the views of any institution, firm, organization, motley crew, gang or cult with whom I am presently associated or have ever been kicked out of. …
"1) I review the requirement that all choices in defined contribution plans governed by ERISA meet the requirements of the prudent investor rule, a tough standard of care which requires adequate diversification to minimize certain risks, not wasting plan participants' assets through high-fee/high-cost investments, and the minimization of the long-term tax drag upon investment returns.
"2) The argument made by some broker-dealer firms, asset managers, and insurance companies that the DOL's rulemaking limits 'choice' is a red herring. By its very nature, the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA constrain conduct, and by doing so counter greed. The U.S. Supreme Court, when opining on ERISA's prudent investor rule, concluded that bad investment choices have no place in retirement plan accounts. Defined contribution plan accounts benefit from economies of scale, that should not be thwarted by high-cost products. The academic evidence is clear — higher-cost products underperform, on average, similar investments that have lower fees and costs.
"3) The DOL's rule proposals align with the common law imposition of fiduciaries for those in relationships of trust and confidence between the fiduciary and the entrustor. Very few plan sponsors are experts as to investment strategies and products. Plan sponsors rely upon those who provide recommendations as to investments and annuities for their expertise. Most 'retirement plan consultants' implicitly accept the imposition of fiduciary duties under common law principles through their titles, words and conduct. Yet many of these retirement plan consultants provide conflicted advice, or, even worse, provide illusory "fiduciary guarantees" that are meaningless. Plan sponsors, and plan participants, deserve the protection of fiduciary advice, and more importantly conflict-free investment recommendations.
"4) The DOL should go further: a. Plan sponsors, who are fiduciaries, should be cautioned to always engage only fiduciaries as investment consultants who proactively eschew conflicts of interest. A true fiduciary avoids revenue-sharing payments and other third-party compensation that create nefarious conflicts of interest, in recognition of the fact, as many a jurist has opined, that a fiduciary cannot serve two masters."